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Rationalizing the Value Premium in Emerging Markets 
 
Abstract: We reconfirm the presence of value premium in emerging markets. Using the 
Brazil-Turkey-India-China (BTIC) grouping during a period of substantial economic growth 
and stock market development, we attribute the premium to the investment patterns of 
glamour firms.  We conjecture based on empirical evidence that glamour firms hoard cash, 
which delays undertaking of growth options, especially in poor economic conditions.  Whilst 
this helps to mitigate business risk, it lowers market valuations and drives down expected 
returns.  Our evidence supports arguments that the value premium is explained by economic 
fundamentals rather than a risk factor that is common to all firms. 
 
 
JEL Classifications: G110 (Portfolio Choice; Investment Decisions), G120 (Asset Pricing). 
 
Keywords:  Asset Pricing, Growth (i.e., Glamour) Stocks, Multifactor Models, Real 
Options, Value (i.e., Unspectacular) Stocks. 
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I. Introduction 
″Growth stocks, which derive market values more from growth options, must 
therefore be riskier than value stocks, which derive market values more from 
assets in place.  Yet, historically, growth stocks earn lower average returns than 
value stocks.″ (Lu Zhang, 2005, pp 67) 
 
Fama and French’s (1992) finding, that a single factor encapsulating risk (beta) does 
not adequately explain cross-sectional differences in stock returns, has motivated an 
important strand of research on asset pricing, reigniting the debate on the fundamental 
relationship between risk and return, and challenging the widely-accepted Capital Asset 
Pricing Model (CAPM).  Subsequently, numerous theoretical and empirical studies examine 
the cross-sectional variation in stock returns with many finding patterns unexplained by the 
CAPM and commonly known as anomalies. 
This paper examines one of the most pronounced anomalies, the value premium puzzle. 
Portfolios formed on the basis of high book-to-market (BE/ME), cash flow-to-price (C/P) and 
earnings-to-price (E/P) are reported to earn significantly higher risk-adjusted returns than 
portfolios with contrasting characteristics.  However, the previous literature fails to achieve a 
consensus on the source of the value premium (Chou et al., 2011).  The objectives of this 
paper are to confirm the presence of value premium in a new market, to provide a new 
rationalization based on economic fundamentals, and to reconcile the diverging perspectives 
which are apparent in the literature.  The value premium reflects a tendency for ‘glamour 
firms’ to hoard cash and delay implementation of growth strategies, particularly in times of 
economic uncertainty (Titman, 1985; McDonald and Siegel, 1986; Ingersoll and Ross, 1992).  
Since growth (glamour) stocks derive their market value from embedded growth in the form 
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of real options (Zhang, 2005), we argue that cash hoarding limits their exposure to risk but 
exerts a significant detrimental impact on their stock returns. 
The theoretical basis for our analysis derives from Fama and French (1995) and Daniel 
and Titman (1997). Fama and French (1995) develop a three-factor model, in which the 
factor that captures distress risk, known as HML, is lower for growth (glamour) firms than 
for value firms.  The debate centers on whether lower distress risk accounts for the 
discrepancy in average returns between value firms and growth firms (Fama and French, 
1995) against claims that distress risk does not contribute to the value premium (Dichev, 
1998; Griffin and Lemmon, 2002).  We contend that both the cash-drag factors and firm 
characteristics, as highlighted by Daniel and Titman (1997), are of relevance. 
In comparison with value firms, growth firms face a wider array of strategic options, 
carrying various levels of risk.  These firms may limit their exposure to risk by abstaining 
from investing resources in risky strategies, especially in poor economic environments.  
Accordingly, growth firms hoard cash when economic conditions are tough, and realize lower 
returns.  By contrast, value firms are prominent in mature and/or declining markets and face a 
more limited range of options. Such firms face financial risk, as well as business risk, owing 
to a tendency to use existing assets as collateral in order to leverage earnings.  They have less 
flexibility in managing their risk, because past sunk-cost investment in assets is irreversible 
(Zhang, 2005).  Our approach in rationalizing the value premium is consistent with the 
neoclassical framework, in which low-risk assets yield lower returns and vice versa. 
Our research draws on two recent studies that contrast the approach of Fama and 
French (1995) with Daniel and Titman (1997). In a similar vein to Daniel and Titman (1997), 
Chen et al. (2011) propose a three-factor model incorporating factors with greater 
explanatory power for cross-sectional returns than the Fama and French model.  We aim to 
extend these findings, by obtaining results that are not sample-specific (a limitation of Chou 
4 
 
 
et al., 2011), and by adopting a real options framework in cases where the Net Present Value 
investment perspective (Chen et al., 2011) is inapplicable.
1
  This paper is among the few that 
try to reconcile differences not only between the neoclassical asset-pricing literature (Fama 
and French versus Daniel and Titman), but also the neoclassical and behavioral literature. 
Our application is to a new grouping of four, large emerging markets: namely, Brazil, 
China, India and Turkey, the BTIC group.
2
  Each of these economies has achieved 
remarkable growth since the early 2000s, which implies there are many firms endowed with 
plentiful growth options.
3
  Our paper addresses two research questions: (i) is a statistically 
significant value premium present in the BTIC? (ii) is it possible to rationalize the value 
premium and reconcile the apparently conflicting views in the literature?  To investigate 
questions (i) and (ii) we source relevant variables from 1999 to 2009 to allow our analysis of 
value anomalies to be conducted under generally favourable economic conditions including 
                                                          
1  Ingersoll and Ross (1992, p. 2) explain this as follows: 
 
“If in making the investment today we lose the opportunity to take on the same project in the future, then 
the project competes with itself delayed in time.  In deciding to take an investment by looking at only its 
NPV, the standard textbook solution tacitly assumes that doing so will in no way affect other investment 
opportunities.  Since a project generally competes with itself when delayed, the textbook assumption is 
generally false.  Notice, too, that the usual intuition concerning the “time value of money” can be quite 
misleading in such situations.  While it is true NPV postponing the project delays the receipt of its positive 
NPV, it is not true that we are better off taking the project now rather than delaying it since delaying 
postpones the investment commitment as well. 
Of course, with a flat, non-stochastic yield curve we would indeed be better off taking the project now, and 
this sort of paradox could not occur.  But that brings up the even more interesting phenomenon that is 
central focus of this article, the effect of interest-rate uncertainty on the timing of investment”. 
 
2  Non-availability of data for Russia precludes investigation of the BRIC quartet (Brazil, Russia, India and 
China).  We select Turkey as an alternative large European emerging economy, and note the creator of the 
BRIC acronym, Jim O’Neill, plans to include Turkey and three other emerging economies in a new 
grouping (Hughes, 2011).   
 
3  The rapid growth of emerging economies, and the impact on the world economy, is discussed extensively 
in the popular press.  For instance, the August 6
th
, 2011 issue of the Economist magazine highlights several 
noteworthy statistics on emerging versus developed economies.  In 2010 emerging economies account for 
nearly 54% of world Gross Domestic Product (GDP) measured at purchasing power parity and 75% of 
global real GDP growth over ten years. Exports exceed 50% of the world total, and imports account for 
47%.  Foreign direct investment (FDI) to emerging economies significantly increased recently as have 
commodity consumption and capital spending. Stock market capitalization equals 35% of the world total, 
this share having tripled since 2000. 
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increasing stock market integration following the liberalization of equity markets in the 
BTIC.  
By way of preview, we find a significant value premium in the BTIC which is not new 
for emerging markets but re-emphasizes the value premium is not a developed country 
phenomenon.  A second result, which is based on the widely-used Altman Z-score model, 
shows value firms are no more prone to risk than growth firms, but value firms employ more 
leverage.  Our evidence suggests the investment patterns of growth firms are the source of the 
value premium.  In an asset-pricing model, the HML coefficients of growth portfolios are 
small during low-growth periods and considerably larger during high-growth periods.  This 
pattern is consistent with the hypothesis that growth firms delay the implementation of new 
strategies in periods of economic uncertainty in order to limit their risk.  The HML 
coefficients of growth portfolios are sensitive to changes in size (total assets).  Accordingly 
growth in total assets, interpreted to proxy implementation of growth strategies, explains the 
change in business risk of growth firms.  This affirms our hypothesis that the investment 
patterns of growth firms impact significantly on their risk and return.  
Our results also resolve the various perspectives in the literature in three ways. First, 
Fama and French (1995) and Daniel and Titman (1997) attribute the outperformance of value 
stocks to different causes.  Daniel and Titman (1997) explain performance differentials 
between value and growth stocks as being due to the characteristics of firms as opposed to 
covariance with risk factors.  Value stocks outperform because growth firms tend to hoard 
cash and delay undertaking the growth options they are endowed with and this drags down 
their returns.  In the Fama and French (1995) framework, this phenomenon is attributed to 
distress risk.  Second, growth firms’ flexibility to manage their embedded growth options to 
their operational and strategic advantage yields not only profit, but also provides utility in its 
own right: embedded options provide ‘glamour firms’ with an allure with which to entice 
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investors.  ‘Fascination’ with growth firms (Sargent, 1987) creates a premium in price (and 
hence a discount in returns), which helps reconcile the neoclassical and behavioral 
perspectives.  Third, the over-reaction hypothesis of DeBondt and Thaler (1985 and 1987) is 
rationalized through the volatile nature of value firms’ leveraged equity, which is akin to Call 
options.  These options are depressed in poor economic states but rebound in prices with 
improving economic climate. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews the relevant literature, and 
identifies the research questions and methodology.  Section III offers a brief synopsis of 
market developments in the BTIC. Section IV presents data and methodology.  The results 
and checks for robustness are in Sections V and VI.  Section VII offers concluding 
comments. 
 
II. Literature Review 
The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) posits that risk, measured using beta, 
accounts for the cross-section of expected stock returns (Sharpe, 1964; Lintner, 1965a,b; 
Mossin, 1966).  Numerous empirical studies test the model, on the assumption that beta is the 
sole explanatory variable with a positive and linear relation to asset return, yet results are 
inconclusive.  Several early empirical studies (Black et al., 1972; Blume and Friend, 1973; 
Fama and McBeth, 1973) provide support for the CAPM.  Later studies, however, are more 
critical, citing evidence of anomalies and questioning the validity of the assumptions (Roll, 
1977; Basu, 1977, 1983; Stattman, 1980; Banz, 1981; DeBondt and Thaler, 1985; Rosenberg 
et al., 1985; Bhandari, 1988; Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993; Cohen et al., 2002; Titman et al., 
2004).  Fama and French (1992) conclude that CAPM with a single factor does not 
adequately explain cross-sectional stock returns, and propose a three-factor model to capture 
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the multidimensional aspect of risk, comprising: (i) a market factor (RM-Rf); (ii) a size 
premium (SMB) (return on a portfolio of small stocks minus return on a portfolio of large 
stocks); and (iii) a value premium (HML) (return on a portfolio of value stocks with high 
BE/ME minus return on a portfolio of growth stocks with low BE/ME).  This approach builds 
on Merton’s (1973) intertemporal CAPM and Ross’s (1976) arbitrage pricing theory (APT).  
Fama and French (1993, 1995) show SMB and HML are related to risk factors in stock 
returns; and both factors contain explanatory power for the cross-sectional variation in stock 
returns.  
The three-factor model has attracted a great deal of academic interest, much of it 
centered on the source of the value premium.  In line with the hypothesis of rational pricing, 
Fama and French (1993) and Chen and Zhang (1998) suggest value firms are riskier and 
more likely to be subject to financial distress than growth firms.  Fama and French (1995) 
demonstrate that value [growth] stocks are generally associated with persistently low [high] 
earnings, creating a positive [negative] loading on HML, which implies higher [lower] risk of 
distress.  On the contrary, Zhang (2005) claims value firms are riskier because their assets at 
risk are larger than those of growth firms.  This becomes particularly evident in poor 
economic environments, where firms with fixed assets pose greater risks for investors than 
those with growth options.  Value firms are burdened with unproductive capital that cannot 
be liquidated in order to recover the cost of the original investment. 
More recent value premium studies investigate how differing states of the world affect 
the strength of the premium.  The empirical evidence contained in these papers demonstrates 
the value premium is time varying and sensitive to changes in economic conditions.  Stivers 
and Sun (2010) show the value premium is countercyclical and higher during periods of weak 
economic fundamentals whereas Guo et al. (2009) find value stocks are riskier than growth 
stocks under weak economic conditions.  Similarly, expected excess returns on value stocks 
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are more sensitive to deteriorating economic conditions during episodes of high market 
volatility (Gulen et al., 2011).  Finally, the size of the value premium positively relates to its 
conditional volatility (Li et al., 2009).  
Several alternative theories also seek to explain the value premium.  Focusing on 
investor sentiment and trading strategies, Lakonishok et al. (1994) and Haugen (1995) 
attribute a tendency for value (‘unspectacular’) firms to produce superior returns to an 
irrational tendency on the part of investors to extrapolate the past strong [weak] performance 
of the growth [value] firm into the future. Investors overbuy [oversell] the growth [value] 
firm’s stock.  Lower [higher] than expected realized performance on the part of the growth 
[value] firm generates a low [high] stock return.
4
  Similarly De Bondt and Thaler (1985, 
1987) observe that poorly performing stocks (‘losers’) over the past three-to-five years 
outperform previous ‘winners’ during the subsequent three-to-five years. 
Daniel and Titman (1997) claim the explanation for the value premium lies in firm 
characteristics rather than covariance risk.  High covariance between the returns of value 
stocks reflects common firm characteristics, such as, the line of business or industry 
classification.  Daniel and Titman (1997) show high covariance between stock returns bears 
no significant relation with the distress factor.  Evidence of high covariance precedes any 
signs of financial distress on the part of value firms.
5
 
Other possible explanations for the value premium focus on methodological issues in 
empirical studies.  Banz and Breen (1986) and Kothari et al. (1995) suggest sample selection 
may be biased towards firms that survived a period of distress, rather than those that failed.  
The notion that survivorship bias accounts for the value premium is rejected, however, by 
Davis (1994), Chan et al. (1995) and Cohen and Polk (1995).  Data ‘snooping’, an eventual 
                                                          
4  La Porta et al. (1997) find value firms enjoy a systematically positive earnings surprise while glamour 
firms display the opposite. 
 
5  Lee et al. (2007) find stock characteristics better explain UK value premiums. 
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tendency for repeated testing using the same data to reveal spurious patterns is cited as an 
explanation for the value premium phenomenon (Lo and MacKinlay, 1988; Black, 1993; 
MacKinlay, 1995; Conrad et al, 2003).  Any such tendency might be mitigated by testing data 
from different periods or countries (Barber and Lyon, 1997). 
In spite of contentions that the value premium is a developed country phenomenon (see 
Black, 1993; MacKinlay, 1995; Campbell, 2000) other evidence supports the proposition of a 
value premium in emerging markets.  In samples containing some (or all) of the BTIC group, 
Rouwenhorst (1999) uses a cross section analysis of returns across twenty emerging markets 
between 1982 and 1997, whereas Barry et al (2002) study 35 emerging markets from 1985 to 
2000.  De Groot and Verschoor (2002) confirm the value premium for a sample of south east 
Asian markets between 1984 and 2000.  Ding et al (2005) also examine markets in south and 
east Asia.  Their study recognizes cross country differences with respect to the value 
premium, but unfortunately the data it uses end prior to the Asian crisis of 1997, which is a 
major drawback as more recent value premium studies suggest the premium may change in 
an economic downturn.  Given the very limited work on explaining the value premium in the 
context of emerging markets, many questions surrounding the value premium remain 
unanswered.  This paper will test for the value premium during the most recent period of 
growth in emerging markets whilst offering a cross country perspective and it will also 
analyse the source of the premium in emerging markets, which few papers undertake.
6
  
 
III. Market developments in the BTIC 
The BTIC countries liberalized their stock markets between the late 1980s and mid-
1990s.  The benefits of liberalization include higher levels of real economic growth and real 
                                                          
6  One exception is a study of Singapore that attributes the value premium to a one-way overreaction of value 
firms (Yen et al., 2004). 
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investment (Bekaert et al., 2003a) with studies reporting a significant relationship between 
stock market liquidity and economic growth (Levine and Zervos, 1998).  Liberalization is 
expected to increase the level of integration between emerging stock markets and the world 
market which should lower country risk premiums.  In the 1990s emerging markets 
represented a new asset class and stock prices in those markets were driven upwards by 
investors seeking to diversify their portfolios, leading to permanently lower costs of capital in 
the emerging markets (Bekaert and Harvey, 2003).  Several studies propose methods to 
effectively date when liberalization takes place (see, Bekaert et al, 2003b; Kim and Kenny, 
2007).
7
  We calculate several indicators to proxy stock market development and growth in the 
BTIC (Source: World Development Indicators).  In 2010, the BTIC share of global stock 
market capitalization equals 15.10% (US$ 8 trillion) increasing by nearly five-fold since the 
2000 level of 3.18%.  The ratio of listed firms’ market capitalization-to-GDP measures the 
level of stock market deepening and it shows the combined BTIC stock market is nearly two 
times deeper in 2010 compared to 2000 (78.47% c.f. 39.66%).  Similarly, the BTIC stock 
markets are more liquid as measured by the ratio of value of stocks traded-to-GDP.  Taking 
1992 as a year to represent pre-stock market liberalization, liquidity increases by a factor of 
eight in Brazil (42.09% in 2010); over thirty four in China (135.40% in 2010); almost nine in 
India (62.74% in 2010); and over eleven in Turkey (57.66% in 2010).  
 
IV. Data and Methodology 
We source data on listed firms in Brazil, Turkey, India and China for the period 1999 to 
2009 from DataStream.  The sample firms meet standard criteria employed widely in the 
literature: stock prices are available for December of year t-1 and June of year t, and book 
                                                          
7  The year of equity market liberalization in the BTIC is as follows: Brazil, 1991; China, 1995; India, 1992; 
and Turkey, 1989 (Kim and Kenny, 2007). 
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value for year t-1; and each firm has at least two years’ complete data.8  Table A1 in the 
Appendix shows the number of firms belonging to each portfolio by country and year. 
In order to identify the existence of a value premium, we employ the standard Fama 
and French (1993) methodology.  We form six portfolios (S/L, S/M and S/H; B/L, B/M and 
B/H) by intersecting two groups that are arranged by ME = market value of equity, and 
BE/ME where BE = net tangible assets (equity capital plus reserves minus intangibles).  
Stocks with ME higher than the median are classified as ‘big’ (B); those with ME below the 
median are classified ‘small’ (S). For BE/ME the three breakpoints are bottom 30% (‘Low’), 
middle 40% (‘Medium’) and top 30% (‘High’).9  We calculate value-weighted monthly 
returns for the six portfolios from July of year t to June of year t+1, when we re-form the 
portfolios.  
In order to explore the sources of the value premium, we divide our analysis into two 
stages.  In the first stage we use measures of bankruptcy risk, proposed by Altman (1993), to 
investigate whether firms with a high likelihood of distress, measured by the Z-score, also 
have a high BE/ME or value premium.
10
  Fama and French (1993) and Chen and Zhang 
(1998) offer empirical evidence to suggest high value firms are assigned a higher risk 
premium because they have a higher probability of distress, implying that bankruptcy risk is a 
systemic factor.  Dichev (1998) and Griffin and Lemmon (2002) offer empirical evidence to 
reject the conjecture that bankruptcy risk is systematic and rewarded by higher returns.  In 
                                                          
8  This criterion is required to address the issue of survival bias (see Banz and Breen, 1986; Kothari, et al., 
1995). 
 
9  We do not use negative book equity (BE) firms when forming the size-BE/ME portfolios for lack of 
economic explanation. 
 
10 We employ the Altman’s (1993) model to evaluate the Z-score: 
Z  =  1.2X1 + 1.4 X2 + 3.3X3 + 0.6X4 + 1.0X5 
 X1 = Working Capital / Total Assets 
 X2 = Retained Earnings / Total Assets 
 X3 = Earnings Before Taxes + Interest / Total Assets 
 X4 = Market value of equity / Total Liabilities 
 X5 = Net Sales / Total Assets 
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what follows, an inverse relationship between the Z-score and BE/ME ratio suggests the 
variables capture information related to a priced distress factor as in Fama and French (1993) 
and Chen and Zhang (1998).  Alternatively, a positive relationship implies the two variables 
contain different information that is potentially related to differences in relative risk across 
firms (see Dichev, 1998; Griffin and Lemmon, 2002).  In the context of this paper, we argue 
that the relative risk results from the idiosyncratic characteristics of each firm. 
For the analysis of bankruptcy risk and value, we follow Griffin and Lemmon (2002) 
and construct a set of portfolios that we form according to the three indicators of BE/ME 
(small, medium and high value), the five quintiles of bankruptcy risk measured by the Z-
score, and two size (ME) measures.  The breakpoints for BE/ME are the 30
th
 and 70
th
 
percentile points. For reporting purposes we show size-adjusted data, which are the simple 
averages of the means of the small and large stocks.  Firms located in the lowest Z-score 
quintile have the highest probability of bankruptcy. 
In the second stage we use 36-month rolling regressions to estimate the Fama and 
French (1995) three factor model to derive time varying HML coefficients for 25 portfolios 
sorted on size and BE/ME.
11
  Changes in the loading over time reflect changes in business 
and financial risk.  Subsequent analysis uses the estimated HML coefficients on growth and 
value portfolios as dependent variables. HML is interpreted to proxy firm characteristics 
which implies common variation in returns arises because individual portfolios comprise 
similar stocks with similar factor loadings irrespective of whether a firm is distressed or not.  
This interpretation follows Daniel and Titman (1997) and it contrasts the view of Fama and 
French (1993) that HML is proxy for distress probability.  A preliminary analysis shows the 
Fama and French (1995) model provides an adequate description of portfolio returns for each 
                                                          
11  The three factor model is given by: Rpt-Rft = α + b (Rmt-Rft) + s SMB + h HML + ε. 
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of the BTIC since none of the estimated alpha coefficients are significantly different from 
zero (see Table 1).
12
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
We use panel data models to estimate the time-varying coefficient on HML for the i’th 
portfolio at time t on a set of conditioning variables known at time t.  The conditioning 
variables are the current and lagged values of the natural logarithms of total assets and total 
debt.  The assets variable captures the sensitivity of the coefficient on HML to growth whilst 
the debt variable measures sensitivity to leverage. GDP growth controls for macroeconomic 
conditions.  Interaction variables allow for differences in the coefficients for value and 
growth portfolios. A Hausman test selects between fixed-effects and random-effects models.  
 
V. Empirical Results 
Table 2 reports the weighted monthly excess returns of the six size-BE/ME portfolios 
constructed using the three factor model (Fama and French, 1993) for each of the BTIC.  For 
portfolios constructed using “big” stocks, we find statistically significant excess returns to 
value firms in excess of returns to growth firms in Turkey, India and China.  In Brazil, excess 
return is highest for the intermediate band. For portfolios constructed using “small” stocks, 
excess returns are significant and higher for value firms in Brazil and China.  Although this 
pattern repeats in Turkey the returns are not significant. In contrast, returns are significant 
and highest for growth firms in India.  A positive and significant VMG (value minus growth) 
confirms the findings for Brazil, Turkey and China.  VMG measures the difference in excess 
returns between value and growth portfolios and equals (B/H+S/H)/2–(B/L+S/L)/2.  Our 
                                                          
12  The average value of beta is different from one depending on the orientation of firms in the economy.  If 
the aggregate firm in the economy is value oriented then beta will be less than 1.  This is consistent with 
studies which demonstrate that stocks with below market risk (low beta) yield higher risk adjusted return 
than predicted by the theoretical CAPM (see Black et al., 1972; Miller and Scholes, 1972), and evidence 
showing value firms have lower beta than growth firms (see Capaul et al., 1993). 
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evidence infers the existence of a value premium in each country except India.  We 
conjecture the fast-growing information technology industry in India, containing many small 
high-technology firms, might account for the exceptionally high excess return in the SG 
portfolio.  
[Insert Table 2 here] 
In Table 3 we construct the portfolios as follows.  Portfolios are sorted into small and 
large categories, and interlocked with value (using breakpoints at the 30
th
 and 70
th
 percentile 
points to define low, medium and high value) and the probability of bankruptcy as indicated 
in quintiles of Z-scores.  Table 3 reports size-adjusted data, the simple average of small and 
large stocks, for bankruptcy risk, size, returns, and leverage.  
Panel A shows little variation in the mean Z-scores between low value and high value 
portfolios in each country except for Indian firms in quintile one for low value stocks (-0.262) 
relative to their high value counterparts (0.803).  The lowest (highest) Z-scores are in Brazil 
(Turkey).  In the higher quintiles and across countries, low and high values stocks achieve 
similar Z-scores, which suggest the presence of value premium is not related to distress risk 
thereby contradicting Fama and French (1995).  Panel B shows the average book-to-market 
ratio of the three stock groupings by quintiles of Z-score.  On average in Brazil, India and 
China, high value firms in the lowest quintile achieve considerably larger book-to-market 
ratios, which again is inconsistent with the Fama and French hypothesis.  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
Table 3 also reports statistics on profitability, leverage, size (capitalization), and total 
assets for firms in each portfolio in order to further examine the hypothesis that the Z-score 
and BE/ME are related to characteristics purported to reflect distress risk.  Panel C shows 
mean profitability is positively related to the Z-score, and is larger for high value firms in 
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each country (except Turkey).  Leverage is inversely related to the Z-score in each country 
(see Panel D).  The data show high value and high risk firms are more heavily levered 
particularly in Brazil and India, which supports our earlier argument that value firms use 
more debt financing than growth firms.  In Brazil and Turkey, low value stocks tend to be 
better capitalized (see Panel E) and larger in terms of total assets whereas high value firms 
are larger in terms of assets size in China and India (see Panel F).  
Table 4 shows the results of rolling regressions estimations of the Fama and French 
three factor model for the six portfolios.  Since our focus is on the coefficient of HML (h), we 
do not discuss other coefficients.  HML is defined as the difference between the simple 
average returns on two high value portfolios (S/H and B/H) and two low value portfolios (S/L 
and B/L).  All B/M portfolios (except China), B/H and S/H portfolios are associated with 
positive values on HML.  That we observe positive loadings on value-orientated portfolios in 
each country demonstrates the presence of the value premium in those markets.  We observe 
negative coefficients on HML for low value portfolios B/L and S/L across countries, and also 
for portfolio S/M (except Turkey).  The findings demonstrate a difference in returns between 
portfolios of growth stocks ranked by firm size. 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
In spite of the apparent heterogeneity in loadings, our findings - at least for Brazil and 
China - are consistent with the contention of Fama and French (1995) that growth [value] 
stocks should have negative [positive] loadings.  In contrast to Fama and French (1995) but 
consistent with Daniel and Titman (1997), we suggest the negative loading on growth firms is 
not a function of distress as our earlier analysis indicates the level of distress is comparable 
for growth and value firms.  Rather, we that contend growth portfolios have lower loadings 
because the choice of delaying growth options gives growth firms the opportunity to reduce 
their risk.  In addition, delaying the exercise of these options enables growth firms to 
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accumulate and/or hoard cash.  Our results offer support for claims that growth portfolios 
earn low returns because of a cash drag effect since cash generates very little return. 
We contend that investors display an ‘infatuation’ with growth firms based on the 
potential growth opportunities stemming from embedded growth options.  Thus, stock prices 
are driven upwards through bidding which contrasts with the ‘unspectacular’ value firms.  In 
Lucas’ Rational Expectations framework (1978), growth firms constitute an ‘alluring’ asset, a 
point further extended by Sargent (1987).  This interpretation reconciles the neoclassical and 
behavioral perspectives.  The leverage of value firms causes a drag on their performance in 
poor economic environments particularly as leveraged equity displays volatility associated 
with financial options (see Merton, 1974).  The expansion of the economy creates a bounce-
back effect on value stocks, helping to reconcile the neoclassical perspective with the 
behavioral as espoused by DeBondt and Thaler (1985, 1987). 
In light of our intuition, we graph the coefficients of HML for twenty of the 25 
portfolios to provide further insight to our argument.
13
  Figure 1a-d illustrate the patterns of 
time varying betas (coefficients of HML) for growth and value portfolios.  The figures, with 
the exception of Turkey, demonstrate that value portfolios have higher beta and are more 
stable over time compared to growth portfolios.  
[Insert Figure 1a-d here] 
The exercise we report on above uses rolling regressions to estimate the three factor 
model. To check the robustness of the results, we re-estimate the models using static panel 
data techniques.  A Hausman test finds the χ2 statistic equal to 38.48 and statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level.  The test result shows the fixed effects model is preferred to 
its random effects counterpart.  Table 5 reports the fixed-effects estimation. 
                                                          
13  We categorize portfolios labelled with L1 and L2 as growth portfolios and L4 and L5 as value portfolios.  
Portfolios labelled with L3 are not graphed because they are neither growth nor value. In Figure 1a-d we 
present four graphs per country rather than 25.  The remainder are available from the authors upon request.  
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Ex ante we expect growth portfolios to exhibit sensitivity to size (total assets) whereas 
value portfolios should display sensitivity to leverage.  Using a binary variable to identify 
value portfolios, we create interaction variables between this indicator and size and leverage, 
at contemporaneous and lagged values for two periods to determine separate value portfolio 
effects.  Lastly, the natural logarithm of GDP growth controls for business cycle effects.  
The results show a positive and significant relation between HML and total assets 
lagged two periods at the 10 per cent significance level.  However, the estimated coefficients 
on the interaction variables with total assets (6 and 8) are negatively signed and statistically 
significant (except 7 the coefficient on the one period lag interaction).  The finding confirms 
the differential between value and growth portfolios in terms of the sensitivity of HML with 
respect to size.  The estimated coefficient on leverage is negative (though insignificant) and 
suggests more highly levered portfolios are less sensitive.  However, the interaction term 
between contemporaneous leverage and HML (9) is positive and highly significant, which 
signals value portfolios are very sensitive to leverage.  
[Insert Table 5 here] 
VI Robustness  
We use an alternative procedure to construct portfolios to test the robustness of the 
results and construct twenty five intersecting size-value portfolios using the quintile 
breakpoints for ME and BE/ME and equally weighted monthly returns instead of value-
weighted returns.  To illustrate, using ‘S’ to indicate size and ‘L’ to indicate BE/ME, the 
portfolio S1L1 contains stocks that are ranked in the first quartile (less than 20%) of both size 
and value.  Table A2 in the Appendix presents the data for the 25 portfolios and confirms the 
finding in Table 1 which demonstrates the Fama and French (1995) model adequately 
describes the portfolio returns.  Table A3 reports the simple excess returns on the 25 
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portfolios by country and checks the robustness of findings reported in Table 2.  The 
distribution of excess returns across portfolios lets us formulate some generalizations: first, 
excess returns on the highest value firms tend to be greater in comparison with low value 
firms; second, the distinction in returns by size is less marked and varies across countries.  
Table A3 shows the smallest firms achieve significant returns, which for some portfolios, 
exceed returns on larger firms.  Both sets of our results confirm findings from several 
previous studies that show high value stocks achieve larger mean expected returns.  In Table 
A4 we report robustness checks for findings in Table 4 using the set of 25 interlocking 
portfolios.  The estimated HML coefficients exhibit intra and inter heterogeneity across the 
BTIC although some generalized country specific patterns are apparent.  For instance, the 
value premium is supported by the positive loadings for medium-to-large sized and medium-
to-high value portfolios in Brazil (except for the portfolio containing the largest and highest 
value stocks).  In the case of China, we observe positive loadings for a limited number of 
portfolios, namely, portfolios of mid-to-large sized firms in the upper two quartiles of value.  
The loadings on portfolios in India and Turkey are all positive (with two exceptions for 
Turkey) yet it is difficult to discern hard patterns across size and value quintiles.  Lastly, we 
observe the magnitude of loadings for India and Turkey to be greater relative to Brazil and 
China.  
 
VII  Conclusion 
A number of theories are postulated to rationalize the source of the value premium yet 
the issue remains controversial.  We reassess this issue for the BTIC group of countries that 
are characterized as having vast economic potential.  The paper rationalizes the value 
premium in terms of economic fundamentals, attributing the premium to the investment 
patterns of growth firms that we contend are more likely to hoard cash, particularly during 
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episodes of economic malaise.  Although this behaviour is understood because it limits 
growth firms’ exposure to risk, nevertheless it negatively impacts on both their market 
valuation and returns. 
The paper helps to reconcile the diverging neoclassical views of Fama and French 
(1995) and Daniel and Titman (1997) in explaining the expected returns of value and growth 
stocks. Fama and French (1995) claim the HML coefficient measures distress risk whereas 
Daniel and Titman (1997) believe it captures firm characteristics.  Our evidence offers 
support for the latter interpretation.  We contest that growth firms are endowed with growth 
options, which entails capital outlay whilst enhancing business risk and it is this feature that 
differentiates growth firms from value firms.  Value firms, by contrast, use fixed assets as 
collateral to lever up in order to boost earnings, which in turn aggravates financial risk.  This 
interpretation of our findings is consistent with Chen et al. (2011).  
We also reconcile the diverging neoclassical and behavioral perspectives by invoking a 
rational expectations perspective (Lucas, 1978) as extended by Sargent (1987).  We consider 
the range of options available to growth firms provides a utility (‘infatuation’) that is separate 
from monetary returns in the forms of capital gains and dividends.  This inherent utility of 
growth firms is attractive to investors and causes their stock prices to appreciate, which 
subsequently lowers returns. 
Our empirical evidence offers three conclusions.  Our first result re-confirms the 
presence of the value premium in emerging markets under favorable economic conditions.  
Second, value stocks and growth stocks are not characterized by different levels of distress as 
suggested by Fama and French (1995).  We observe value firms are more highly levered than 
growth firms, which reconciles the behavioral perspective (DeBondt and Thaler, 1985, 1987) 
with the neoclassical perspective (Merton, 1974).  We contend the leverage behavior of value 
firms exhibits characteristics similar to volatile financial options, which plummet very fast 
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during economic downturns and rebound equally fast upon recovery.  Our findings are robust 
to alternative means of portfolio construction.  
Third, by observing the time varying pattern of conditional beta (HML) we find value 
(growth) portfolios are less (more) sensitive to size but more (less) sensitive to leverage.  As 
a robustness check, fixed-effects methods demonstrate the value premium is attributable to 
economic fundamentals in a static framework.  The finding that growth portfolios are 
sensitive to changes in total assets reaffirms our belief that the risk and return structure of 
growth firms is determined by their investment pattern.  We believe our paper provides 
further insights on the source of the value premium, particularly in the context of the under-
researched emerging economies. 
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Table 1: Weighted Monthly Excess Returns for Portfolios Sorted on Size (ME) and 
Value (BE/ME) - July 1999 to June 2009, 120 Months (%) 
 
Stocks with ME above the median are deemed ‘big’ whilst stocks with ME below the median are 
‘small’. The breakpoints for BE/ME are the 30th and 70th percentiles. The intersection produces six 
portfolios: B/L = big-low value; B/M = big-middle value; B/H = big-high value; S/L = small-low 
value; S/M = small-middle value, S/H = small-high value. Returns are generated using the Fama and 
French (1993) three factor model: Rpt - Rft  =  α + b (Rmt-Rft) + s SMB + h HML + ε.  
 
*,**,*** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percentage levels. 
 
Portfolio B/L B/M B/H S/L S/M S/H 
Brazil 
α 1.89*** 0.52 1.69*** 1.16 1.35* 1.89*** 
b 0.22 0.86*** 0.04 0.13 0.21* 0.24 
s -0.28** -0.68*** -0.70*** 0.86*** 0.62** 0.12 
h -0.10 0.54*** 0.56*** -0.73*** -0.26 0.82*** 
Turkey 
α 0.52*** -2.18*** -0.04 -0.06 -1.18*** -0.31 
b 1.26*** 0.09*** 0.35*** 1.06*** 0.54*** 0.63*** 
s -0.30*** 0.98*** 0.58*** 1.88*** 1.10*** 1.25*** 
h -0.32*** 0.92*** 0.63*** -0.07 0.38*** 0.39*** 
India 
α -0.30* 0.63*** 0.92 1.64** 0.05 -0.08 
b 0.86*** 1.12*** 1.01*** 1.34*** 0.83*** 0.98*** 
s -0.04* -0.07*** 0.10 2.79*** 0.44*** 0.74*** 
h -0.02 0.01 0.13* -1.94*** 0.21** 0.48*** 
China 
α -0.17 -0.02 -0.01 -0.00 0.12 -0.19** 
b 0.96*** 1.03*** 1.01*** 0.98*** 0.96*** 0.98*** 
s 0.02 -0.22*** -0.09 0.87*** 0.78*** 0.96*** 
h -0.48*** -0.21*** 0.57*** -0.39*** 0.00 0.43*** 
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Table 2: Weighted Monthly Excess Returns on Portfolios Sorted on Size and Value  
– July 1999 to June 2009, 120 Months: Summary Statistics (%) 
 
Stocks with ME above the median are deemed ‘big’ whilst stocks with ME below the median are 
‘small’. The breakpoints for BE/ME are the 30th and 70th percentiles. The intersection produces six 
portfolios: B/L = big-low value; B/M = big-middle value; B/H = big-high value; S/L = small-low 
value; S/M = small-middle value, S/H = small-high value. VMG = value minus growth and is given 
by [{(S/H+B/H)/2}-{(S/L+B/L)/2}]. RPTRFT = return on portfolio minus the risk free rate. Returns 
are generated using the Fama and French (1993) three factor model: Rpt - Rft  =  α + b (Rmt-Rft) + s SMB 
+ h HML + ε.  
 
We test Ho = 0; H1 > 0. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percentage levels. 
 
Portfolio RPTRFT Portfolio RPTRFT 
Brazil 
B/L 2.13*** S/L 1.38** 
B/M 2.21*** S/M 2.10*** 
B/H 1.82*** S/H 3.48*** 
VMG         0.895* 
   
 
Turkey 
TURKEY 
Turkey 
B/L -0.84 S/L 1.19 
B/M    0.62 S/M 0.47 
B/H     1.70** S/H 1.48 
VMG              1.415*  
India 
B/L 0.81 S/L 8.01** 
B/M    2.10** S/M 2.67*** 
B/H     2.81*** S/H 3.91*** 
VMG  -1.05  
China 
B/L 0.12 S/L 0.76 
B/M    0.37 S/M 1.09* 
B/H     0.92* S/H 1.13* 
VMG 0.585***   
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Table 3: Firm Characteristics for Portfolios Sorted on Value, Distress Probability and 
Size - Summary Statistics 
 
Portfolios are formed by intersecting BE/ME (low, medium, high - the breakpoints are at the 30
th
 and 
70
th
 percentile points); five quintiles of bankruptcy risk (Z-score); and two size (ME) measures (above 
and below the median). We report size-adjusted data i.e. the simple averages of the means of the small 
and large stocks. Firms from July 1999 to June 2009 are ranked independently every June. 
 
BE/ME Low Medium High Low Medium High 
Panel A: Z-score 
Z-score  Brazil   Turkey  
1 0.560 0.572 0.418   0.735 0.811 0.772 
2   1.414 1.389 1.608    2.105 2.160 2.051 
3 2.060 2.303 2.019  3.517 3.486 3.524 
4 
5 
3.590 
7.201 
3.157 
8.710 
 3.040 
8.162 
8.939 
69.948 
8.810 
62.708 
 7.979 
69.621 
  India   China  
1 -0.262 0.940 0.803 1.147 1.454 1.352 
2   1.811 1.898 1.738   2.757 2.645 2.575 
3 2.910 2.911 2.490 4.277 4.145 3.891 
4 
5 
5.320 
20.919 
4.312 
18.018 
 5.190 
17.388 
7.185 
15.893 
6.760 
16.027 
 6.689 
16.800 
 
Panel B: BE/ME (book-to-market equity) 
Z-score  Brazil   Turkey  
1 0.563 2.236 13.40 0.424 1.071 2.676 
2 0.425 2.074 10.04 0.439 1.079 2.265 
3 0.528 2.023 8.526 0.509 1.059 1.986 
4 
5 
0.467 
0.542 
2.060 
1.917 
9.570 
9.191 
0.429 
0.431 
1.046 
1.021 
2.401 
2.110 
  India   China  
1 0.233 0.915 12.935 0.169 0.391 2.029 
2 0.241 0.826 5.477 0.186 0.386 0.890 
3 0.282 0.769 9.165 0.189 0.379 0.784 
4 
5 
0.242 
0.211 
0.807 
0.788 
2.640 
1.800 
0.185 
0.194 
0.376 
0.382 
0.730 
0.664 
 
Panel C: RoA (income before extraordinary items and tax/total assets) 
Z-score  Brazil   Turkey  
1 -0.561 2.582 4.204 2.129 2.518 1.161 
2 8.242 7.777 10.039 10.329 11.724 8.022 
3 11.840 11.093       9.718 10.876 8.793 10.851 
4 
5 
12.801 
12.895 
11.389 
12.508 
12.408 
16.960 
11.407 
11.201 
11.779 
11.186 
11.443 
10.703 
  India   China  
1 1.279 1.113 4.326 -3.133 1.824 2.796 
2 3.016 7.057 8.916 1.942 3.603 4.181 
3 8.164 9.622 10.18 3.184 4.505 4.971 
4 
5 
11.293 
10.369 
13.055 
13.715 
16.138 
5.989 
4.574 
5.783 
5.539 
5.913 
5.836 
5.427 
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BE/ME Low Medium High Low Medium High 
 
Panel D: Leverage (total assets - book equity / market value of equity) 
Z-score  Brazil   Turkey  
1 2.373 5.260 13.883 38.514 47.914 17.290 
2 1.687 3.526 12.184 2.407 3.945 1.839 
3 2.347 2.235 4.987 1.595 1.887 3.097 
4 
5 
0.664 
0.294 
1.401 
0.311 
2.871 
0.686 
0.192 
0.019 
0.195 
0.0228 
0.542 
0.017 
  India   China  
1 1.851 3.648 22.492 0.683 0.897 2.261 
2 0.773 1.412 3.951 0.375 0.458 0.736 
3 0.566 0.671 11.65 0.249 0.299 0.366 
4 
5 
0.210 
0.084 
0.513 
0.111 
0.482 
0.054 
0.142 
0.604 
0.171 
0.060 
0.187 
0.067 
 
Panel E: Size (US$ m, market value of equity) 
Z-score  Brazil   Turkey  
1 1,159 785 126 443 116 47 
2 1,515 1,629 572 447 194 141 
3 3,491 1,594 491 664 381 205 
4 
5 
10,800 
2,558 
5,086 
642 
166 
71 
1,921 
1,575 
273 
698 
116 
571 
  India   China  
1 11,000 15,400 3,463 2,969 4,116 3,682 
2 46,800 9,978 3,201 3,106 4,171 5,050 
3 27,100 30,100 4,202 3,518 6,638 6,306 
4 
5 
81,600 
33,000 
95,200 
8,027 
3,381 
692 
4,495 
4,147 
8,669 
12,100 
5,073 
3,314 
       
Panel F: Total Assets (US$ m, book value) 
Z-score  Brazil   Turkey  
1 3,339 3,995 1,800 6,824 3,845 3,232 
2 3,776 7,321 3,066 1,135 1,600 938 
3 4,274 4,914 1,827 1,215 1,201 871 
4 
5 
14,600 
2,212 
8,870 
799 
975 
245 
1,099 
389 
433 
323 
265 
243 
  India   China  
1 3,9200 49,700 53,200 3,292 6,413 8,261 
2 5,6100 27,600 23,400 2,265 4,077 7,660 
3 2,0200 32,222 56,500 2,058 5,076 8,662 
4 
5 
7,0700 
1,0300 
55,000 
8,255 
10,200 
2,416 
1,946 
1,549 
6,623 
4,345 
5,983 
3,035 
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Table 4: Mean Coefficients of Rolling Regressions: Portfolios Sorted on Size and Value 
Stocks with ME above the median are deemed ‘big’ whilst stocks with ME below the median are 
‘small’. The breakpoints for BE/ME are the 30th and 70th percentiles. The intersection produces six 
portfolios: B/L = big-low value; B/M = big-middle value; B/H = big-high value; S/L = small-low 
value; S/M = small-middle value, S/H = small-high value. The coefficients are estimated from 36 
month rolling regressions of the Fama and French (1993) three factor model: Rpt - Rft  =  α + b (Rmt-Rft) 
+ s SMB + h HML + ε. Rm - Rf is the return on the market portfolio less the risk free rate. SMB is the 
difference between the simple average of returns on small stock portfolios (S/L, S/M, S/H) and big 
stock portfolios (B/L, B/M, B/H). HML is the difference between the simple average of returns on 
two high value portfolios (S/H, B/H) and returns on two low value portfolios (S/L, B/L). 
 
 B/L B/M B/H S/L S/M S/H 
Brazil 
Constant, α 1.497 0.869 1.135 0.611 1.062 1.408 
Rm-Rf, b 0.566 0.697 0.201 0.158 0.232 0.582 
SMB, s  -0.046 -0.828 -0.900 1.115 0.324 0.412 
HML, h -0.199 0.599 0.782 -0.950 -0.026 0.666 
Turkey 
Constant, α 0.544 -2.233 0.126 -0.093 -1.108 -0.457 
Rm-Rf, b 1.210 0.037 0.730 0.885 0.596 0.568 
SMB, s  -0.308 0.996 0.061 1.981 0.912 1.265 
HML, h -0.296 0.977 0.283 0.090 0.335 0.438 
India 
Constant, α -0.221 0.487 1.124 1.294 0.026 -0.050 
Rm-Rf, b 0.918 1.067 1.006 1.194 0.987 0.968 
SMB, s  0.141 -0.245 0.006 2.052 1.134 0.645 
HML, h -0.243 0.200 0.373 -1.416 -0.342 0.532 
China 
Constant, α 0.001 0.043 -0.015 -0.048 -0.217 -0.087 
Rm-Rf, b 1.002 1.008 1.009 0.983 0.907 0.986 
SMB, s  -0.185 -0.199 -0.178 0.749 0.518 0.892 
HML, h -0.639 -0.223 0.538 -0.422 -0.064 0.337 
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Table 5: Fixed effects regression of the sensitivity of HML 
 
HML is the difference between the simple average of returns on two high value portfolios (S/H, B/H) 
and returns on two low value portfolios (S/L, B/L). It is calculated for 20 portfolios sorted on size 
(BE) and value (BE/ME) using quintile breakpoints, and is recalculated when the portfolios are 
rebalanced. We use a fixed effects regression to estimate the model: 
 
HML = α + β0 Total Assetsit + β1 Total Assetsit-1 + β2 Total Assetsit-2 + β3Leverageit + β4Leverageit-1 + 
β5Leverageit-2+ β6Total Assets * Dit + β7Total Assets * Dit-1 + β8Total Assets * Dit-2 + β9Leverage * Dit 
+ β10Leverage * Dit-1 + β11Leverage * Dit-2 + β12 GDPt + ηi + ηt + εit  
 
Where: ηi is an unobserved portfolio-specific effect and ηt captures common period-specific effects; εit 
is an error term, which represents measurement errors and other explanatory variables that have been 
omitted. It is assumed to be independently identical normally distributed with zero mean and constant 
variance. D is a dummy variable taking the value of unity if the portfolio is value and 0 otherwise.  
 
*, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
Independent Variables Coefficient t 
Total Assets 0.0442 0.50 
Total Assetst-1 
Total Assetst-2                                                    
-0.0403 
0.1651*  
-0.41 
1.80 
Total Leverage -0.0910 -1.48 
Total Leveraget-1 
Total Leveraget-2 
0.0613 
-0.0797 
0.81 
-1.19 
Total Assets * D  -0.2980** -2.06 
Total Assets * Dt-1    -0.1534    -0.97 
Total Assets * Dt-2 -0.2982** -2.04 
Total Debt * D 0.2932*** 2.67 
Total Debt * Dt-1 0.0748 0.62 
Total Debt * Dt-2 
GDP growth 
 
0.1572 
-0.0034 
1.43 
-0.41 
Constant 1.0999 1.45 
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Figure 1a-d 
1a. Patterns of HML for Portfolios sorted on Size and BE/ME: Brazil 
 
1b. Patterns of HML for Portfolios sorted on Size and BE/ME: Turkey 
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1c. Patterns of HML for Portfolios sorted on Size and BE/ME: India 
 
 
1d. Patterns of HML for Portfolios sorted on Size and BE/ME: China 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1: Portfolio composition - numbers of firms: by country and year 
 
Portfolio 
BRAZIL 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Total 
BG 23 30 30 30 31 32 29 36 35 44 320 
BM 21 30 31 31 32 32 38 34 36 40 325 
BV 23 8 4 10 8 7 4 8 14 10 96 
SG 8 8 7 8 7 7 11 7 12 7 82 
SM 20 20 16 15 16 18 18 24 25 31 203 
SV 29 37 42 41 46 46 45 46 53 56 441 
Total 124 133 130 135 140 142 145 155 175 188 1467 
 
 
Portfolio 
TURKEY 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Total 
BG 18 21 22 25 23 26 28 28 32 32 255 
BM 13 16 21 22 23 27 22 25 32 35 236 
BV 7 6 6 10 13 9 13 15 14 12 105 
SG 5 6 8 10 13 12 11 13 16 12 105 
SM 17 17 17 22 24 22 27 29 29 27 231 
SV 16 21 24 25 23 29 26 26 34 36 260 
Total 76 87 98 114 119 125 127 136 157 158 1197 
 
 
Portfolio 
INDIA 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Total 
BG 36 41 40 43 44 47 57 58 63 67 496 
BM 27 26 35 39 48 44 54 55 56 63 447 
BV 3 7 5 6 6 9 14 18 17 13 98 
SG 4 4 9 11 15 14 18 21 19 19 134 
SM 26 32 28 30 30 35 46 50 53 51 381 
SV 37 38 44 48 53 52 61 61 65 73 532 
Total 133 148 161 177 196 201 250 263 273 286 2088 
 
 
Portfolio 
CHINA 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Total 
BG 81 94 106 111 119 136 158 170 205 208 1388 
BM 131 149 160 174 179 213 219 215 213 270 1923 
BV 103 115 157 171 190 165 177 167 165 154 1564 
SG 108 121 149 163 175 173 175 162 146 172 1544 
SM 121 137 177 190 210 198 224 226 252 235 1970 
SV 86 100 98 103 104 144 156 165 186 226 1368 
Total 630 716 847 912 977 1029 1109 1105 1167 1265 9757 
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Table A2: Simple Monthly Excess Returns for Portfolios Sorted on Size and Value  
-  7/1999-6/2009, 120 Months (%) 
We construct 25 portfolios by intersecting size (BE) and value (BE/ME) using quintile breakpoints. For instance 
S1L1 refers to the lowest quintiles (bottom 20%) in size and value. We generate returns using a three factor 
model: Rpt - Rft  =  α + b (Rmt-Rft) + s SMB + h HML + ε (Fama and French, 1993). 
*,**,*** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percentage levels. 
 
Brazil 
Value  Low 2 3 4  High 
Size     α     
Small 3.18* 0.26 7.54* 3.03** 4.45*** 
2 0.31 2.75** 1.95** 3.11*** 2.86*** 
3 0.86 2.54** 2.92** 1.65*** 3.14* 
4 2.57*** 1.74* 2.10** 2.60*** 4.56*** 
Big 1.56** 1.91** 3.16*** 2.66*** 2.54 
   b   
Small 0.05 0.06 0.49 0.15 0.12 
2 0.17 0.17 0.32 0.18 0.21 
3 0.29*** 0.1 0.17 0.20* 0.05 
4 0.15 0.35*** 0.24 0.21 -0.09 
Big 0.19 0.13 0.18 0.19 1.49 
   s   
Small 1.01* 0.29 -0.56 0.14 0.52** 
2 0.43 0.70 0.09 0.42 -0.39* 
3 0.12 -0.02 0.48 0.21 -0.19 
4 0.03 0.26** -0.23 -0.34* -0.77*** 
Big -0.12 -0.53** -0.73*** -0.75*** 2.64** 
   h   
Small 
 
-0.49 -0.30 0.29 -0.04 0.13 
2 -0.46 0.24 0.15 0.01 0.71*** 
3 0.08 0.01 -0.21 0.01 0.97*** 
4 -0.15 -0.14 0.18 0.26* 0.82*** 
Big -0.05 0.23 0.34* 0.43*** -1.85 
Turkey 
Size     α     
Small -1.68 0.65 -0.75 -0.11 0.04 
2 0.23 -0.91 -0.65 -0.50 -0.35 
3 1.40 -0.64 -1.12*** -0.94 0.37 
4 -1.61** -1.24*** -1.84*** 0.26 -0.19 
Big -0.72 -1.54** -2.08*** -1.26 1.38 
   b   
Small 0.46** 0.74*** 0.34*** 0.54*** 0.55*** 
2 1.49* 0.61*** 0.58*** 0.65*** 0.36*** 
3 0.94*** 0.57** 0.45*** 0.47*** 0.75*** 
4 0.46*** 0.34*** 0.23* 0.34*** 0.45*** 
Big 0.61*** 0.36** 0.08 0.41*** 0.44** 
   s   
Small 1.45*** 0.89*** 1.04*** 1.16*** 1.13*** 
2 2.54** 1.17*** 0.93*** 1.29*** 1.34*** 
3 1.45*** 0.78** 1.14*** 1.15*** 1.37*** 
4 0.99*** 0.94*** 1.12*** 0.97*** 0.92*** 
Big 0.37** 0.94*** 0.89*** 0.92*** 0.29 
   h   
Small 
 
0.51*** 0.04 0.54*** 0.37*** 0.44*** 
2 0.04 0.42*** 0.41*** 0.36*** 0.66*** 
3 -0.11 0.30 0.55*** 0.41*** 0.51*** 
4 0.53*** 0.63*** 0.77*** 0.64*** 0.55*** 
Big 0.25 0.72*** 0.98*** 0.70*** 0.57*** 
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India 
Value  Low 2 3 4  High 
Size     α     
Small 2.14 2.65* 2.33* 3.06** 3.28*** 
2 2.46 2.29* 2.46 2.66* 3.78*** 
3 3.84 1.62* 2.18 2.25** 3.55** 
4 1.78 2.13 1.95* 3.53** 1.37 
Big 0.98 1.85 1.76 1.95 4.30*** 
   b   
Small 0.26 0.31** 0.32** 0.33** 0.33** 
2 0.55*** 0.41** 0.55 0.47*** 0.44** 
3 0.13 0.56*** 0.41*** 0.35*** 0.42*** 
4 0.28* 0.40** 0.35** 0.39** 0.33** 
Big 0.46*** 0.43** 0.52*** 0.47*** 0.51*** 
   s   
Small -0.01 0.06 0.12 -0.03 -0.01 
2 0.24 -0.02 0.24 -0.05 -0.08 
3 0.05 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.06 
4 -0.02 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.08 
Big 0.08 0.04 0.05 0.01 0.06 
   h   
Small 
 
0.01 0.04 0.09 0.07* 0.06 
2 0.22 0.01 0.22 0.03 -0.04 
3 0.04 0.79 0.05 0.05 0.11** 
4 0.08 0.03 0.12*** 0.11* 0.08 
Big 0.06 0.10* 0.08 0.08 0.02 
China 
Size     α     
Small 0.56*** 0.91*** 1.55** 1.95*** 1.06** 
2 -0.02 1.18** 1.34** 1.70*** 1.38** 
3 0.17 0.14 0.31 0.96* 0.30 
4 -0.22 0.35 0.23 0.42** 0.20 
Big -0.10 0.22 0.15 0.24 0.24* 
   b   
Small 0.85*** 0.90*** 0.67*** 0.62*** 1.14*** 
2 1.02*** 0.89*** 0.73*** 0.58*** 0.75*** 
3 0.74*** 0.81*** 0.97*** 0.80*** 0.96*** 
4 0.99*** 0.97*** 0.79*** 1.04*** 1.02*** 
Big 0.72*** 0.93*** 0.92*** 0.96*** 1.04*** 
   s   
Small 0.93*** 0.88*** 0.32 -0.17 0.99*** 
2 0.86*** 0.47** 0.21 0.16 0.21 
3 0.79*** 0.84*** 0.71*** 0.28 0.78*** 
4 0.66*** 0.26*** 0.65*** 0.68*** 0.64*** 
Big 0.20* 0.17** 0.11** 0.12** 0.06 
   h   
Small 
 
-0.32*** -0.30** -0.25 -1.15*** 0.28 
2 -0.29*** -0.70*** -0.55** -0.79* -0.42 
3 -0.11 0.21 0.00 -0.46* 0.32** 
4 -0.34*** -0.30** 0.14 0.07 0.41*** 
Big -0.26 -0.36*** -0.03 0.20*** 0.48*** 
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Table A3: Simple Monthly Excess Returns on Portfolios Sorted on Size and Value  
– July 1999 to June 2009, 120 Months: Summary Statistics (%) 
 
We construct 25 portfolios by intersecting size (BE) and value (BE/ME) using quintile breakpoints. 
For instance S1L1 refers to the lowest quintiles (bottom 20%) in size and value. PT = portfolio and 
RPTRFT = return on portfolio minus the risk-free rate. We generate returns using a three factor 
model: Rpt - Rft  =  α + b (Rmt-Rft) + s SMB + h HML + ε (Fama and French, 1993). 
 
We test Ho = 0; H1 > 0. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percentage levels. 
 
 
PT RPTRFT PT RPTRFT PT RPTRFT PT RPTRFT PT RPTRFT 
Brazil 
S1L1 3.59** S2L1 0.62 S3L1 1.69** S4L1 2.81*** S5L1 1.90*** 
S1L2 0.26 S2L2 4.02*** S3L2 2.78*** S4L2 2.69*** S5L2 2.07*** 
S1L3 8.97*** S2L3 3.02*** S3L3 3.52*** S4L3 2.72*** S5L3 3.39*** 
S1L4 3.48*** S2L4 3.93*** S3L4 2.34*** S4L4 3.15*** S5L4 3.00*** 
S1L5 5.30*** S2L5 3.85*** S3L5 4.16*** S4L5 4.35*** S5L5 0.46 
 Turkey 
S1L1 0.58 S2L1 2.18 S3L1 2.21 S4L1 0.26 S5L1 -0.60 
S1L2 1.31 S2L2 0.84 S3L2 0.53 S4L2 0.84 S5L2 0.71 
S1L3 1.22 S2L3 0.74 S3L3 0.94 S4L3 0.73 S5L3 0.75 
S1L4 1.56 S2L4 1.24 S3L4 0.84 S4L4 2.39** S5L4 0.89 
S1L5 1.82* S2L5 2.15* S3L5 2.47* S4L5 0.76 S5L5 3.54*** 
India 
INDIA S1L1 2.51* S2L1 4.18 S3L1 4.21** S4L1 2.26** S5L1 1.94** 
S1L2 3.31** S2L2 2.84** S3L2 2.53** S4L2 2.84*** S5L2 2.71** 
S1L3 3.22*** S2L3 2.82** S3L3 2.94** S4L3 2.73** S5L3 2.75** 
S1L4 3.56*** S2L4 3.24*** S3L4 2.84** S4L4 4.39*** S5L4 2.83** 
S1L5 3.82*** S2L5 4.15*** S3L5 4.47*** S4L5 2.16** S5L5 5.38*** 
China 
CHINA S1L1 1.31** S2L1 0.83 S3L1 0.93* S4L1 0.49 S5L1 0.27 
S1L2 1.69*** S2L2 1.51** S3L2 1.17** S4L2 0.87* S5L2 0.65 
S1L3 2.00*** S2L3 1.54** S3L3 1.23** S4L3 1.11** S5L3 0.74 
S1L4 1.53** S2L4 1.63** S3L4 1.29** S4L4 1.43** S5L4 1.01* 
S1L5 2.40*** S2L5 1.67** S3L5 1.46** S4L5 1.39** S5L5 1.20** 
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Table A4: Mean Coefficients of Rolling Regressions: Portfolios sorted on Size and Value 
See Table A2. We estimate coefficients on 36 month rolling regressions of a three factor model: Rpt - Rft  =  α + b 
(Rmt-Rft) + s SMB + h HML + ε. Rm - Rf is the return on the market portfolio less the risk-free rate. SMB is the 
difference between the simple average of returns on small stock (S/L, S/M, S/H) and big stock portfolios (B/L, 
B/M, B/H). HML is the difference between the simple average of returns on high value (S/H, B/H) and low 
value portfolios (S/L, B/L). 
 L1 L2 L3 L4 L5  L1 L2 L3 L4 L5 
Brazil 
 Constant  Market 
S1 4.810 -0.544 4.752 3.298 3.740  0.097 0.194 0.296 0.212 0.312 
S2 -0.179 3.387 1.571 3.135 2.802  0.211 0.321 0.361 0.124 0.570 
S3 0.249 2.432 1.921 1.056 3.471  0.386 0.144 0.278 0.325 0.155 
S4 2.220 1.129 1.890 2.007 2.078  0.001 0.256 0.225 0.313 -0.620 
S5 1.257 1.066 2.194 1.715 4.023  0.372 0.317 0.526 0.503 1.534 
 SMB  HML 
S1 1.742 0.309 -2.341 0.382 0.841  -0.996 -0.297 1.157 -0.228 -0.046 
S2 0.760 0.951 0.087 0.464 -0.257  -0.769 -0.080 0.087 -0.081 0.777 
S3 -0.030 0.165 0.024 -0.063 -0.106  0.275 -0.145 0.207 0.288 0.809 
S4 -0.242 0.219 -0.304 -0.320 -0.513  0.100 -0.121 0.166 0.284 0.462 
S5 -0.158 -0.457 -0.700 -0.474 3.483  0.002 0.259 0.369 0.363 -2.465 
Turkey 
 Constant Market 
S1 -1.212 1.174 -0.760 -0.389 -0.059  0.025 0.733 0.390 0.453 0.352 
S2 -2.760 -0.676 -0.783 -1.238 -0.209  0.494 0.644 0.226 0.471 0.262 
S3 3.367 -1.641 -1.012 -1.506 0.126  1.320 0.239 0.460 0.576 0.671 
S4 -2.311 -1.407 -2.324 -0.132 -0.533  0.174 0.320 0.144 0.390 0.631 
S5 -0.822 -1.396 -2.300 -0.862 1.062  0.727 0.311 0.295 0.552 0.583 
 SMB HML 
S1 1.347 0.494 1.108 1.096 1.110  0.771 -0.085 0.552 0.459 0.541 
S2 1.935 0.920 0.959 1.107 1.321  0.655 0.397 0.696 0.514 0.692 
S3 1.995 1.194 1.031 1.020 1.255  -0.326 0.774 0.518 0.392 0.547 
S4 0.917 0.957 1.142 1.008 0.919  0.637 0.654 0.894 0.670 0.499 
S5 0.311 0.708 0.803 0.396 -0.062  0.186 0.662 0.838 0.418 0.336 
India 
 Constant Market 
S1 1.407 1.820 1.594 1.590 2.194  -0.005 0.407 0.182 0.206 0.179 
S2 -0.411 1.258 1.038 0.988 2.835  0.263 0.282 0.332 0.336 0.220 
S3 5.427 0.507 1.177 1.010 2.425  -0.322 0.362 0.327 0.267 0.238 
S4 0.115 0.896 1.003 2.400 0.138  0.147 0.225 0.157 0.248 -0.050 
S5 0.189 0.748 -0.023 0.681 3.002  0.291 0.275 0.476 0.424 0.578 
 SMB HML 
S1 -0.690 -0.075 -0.745 -0.601 -0.519  0.573 0.171 0.695 0.505 0.416 
S2 -0.545 -0.669 -0.571 -0.644 -0.705  0.661 0.414 0.497 0.524 0.426 
S3 -0.455 -0.689 -0.670 -0.697 -0.773  0.329 0.645 0.438 0.507 0.731 
S4 -0.643 -0.600 -0.654 -0.711 -1.576  0.616 0.489 0.623 0.615 0.672 
S5 -0.448 -0.588 -0.632 -0.525 -0.287  0.438 0.519 0.560 0.406 0.079 
China 
 Constant  Market 
S1 0.608 0.706 0.505 0.413 0.461  0.852 0.847 0.595 0.468 1.119 
S2 -0.191 0.619 0.686 0.325 1.808  1.021 0.751 0.398 0.418 0.844 
S3 0.252 0.467 0.053 -0.127 0.300  0.882 0.873 0.843 0.674 0.874 
S4 0.158 0.486 0.671 0.456 0.353  1.063 0.997 0.865 1.021 1.032 
S5 0.347 0.489 0.467 0.379 0.425  0.908 0.949 0.967 0.972 1.030 
 SMB  HML 
S1 0.842 0.724 -0.023 0.019 1.199  -0.409 -0.406 -0.177 -0.440 0.317 
S2 0.791 0.623 0.314 0.473 0.391  -0.312 -0.352 -0.355 0.021 -0.232 
S3 0.633 0.781 0.548 0.523 0.654  -0.131 0.108 0.002 0.037 0.328 
S4 0.498 0.243 0.283 0.512 0.493  -0.662 -0.385 -0.057 0.133 0.280 
S5 -0.230 -0.122 -0.064 0.002 -0.060  -0.562 -0.543 -0.101 0.096 0.364 
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